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Abstract
This paper outlines how the human information processing model of Wick-
ens is combined with Hollnagel’s cognitive control mode model and human error
models for application within the context of conventional Air Traffic Management
(ATM). The aim of this model-based approach is to enable the evaluation of both
accident risk and aspects like cognitive workload and reliability of the human
controller in managing air traffic situations safely. The combined model has been
integrated with models for pilot, aircraft and other ATM elements and a compari-
son with available statistical data is made through running Monte Carlo simula-
tions with the integrated model.
Keywords: Human reliability, Methodology, Aerospace Transportation
1. Introduction
Since air traffic is steadily growing, there are populated areas in the US and
in Europe where the air traffic demand is higher than the capacity that can be re-
alised with established operations. In order to resolve this situation, it is necessary
to introduce new effective operations in Air Traffic Management (ATM). The high
safety standards in civil aviation in combination with the complexity of ATM
make it far from trivial to foresee the consequences of introducing new operations
with respect to safety. By the very nature of civil aviation, the ATM architecture is
highly distributed: there are human controllers in each aircraft, at each airport, and
also in each node of the global network of ground based air traffic service centers.
Statistical analysis is not very helpful here; it is not even sufficient to analyze
safety of present operations in ATM, let alone to predict future operations. Since
pilots and air traffic controllers currently play a key role in realising the high
safety standards in civil aviation, special attention must be directed to the model-




The aim of this paper is to outline how such modelling has been accom-
plished in [1] on the basis of the following three psychological models:
- Human error models that are in use for aviation incident and accident investi-
gations (e.g. [2], [3]).
- Multiple resources theory [4] which is in use for human centered designs in
aviation [5].
- Control modes of human cognition [6], which assumes that human controllers
strategy and degree of control varies significantly over time.
The paper outlines how these approaches are combined into a single model for a
tactical controller in a conventional en-route ATM context. First, a suitable de-
composition into controller subtasks is outlined in Section 2. Next, Section 3
shows how this is combined  with the cognitive control mode model. Section 4
compares some Monte Carlo simulation results obtained with the new model with
realistic data. Section 5 draws conclusions.
2. Controller subtasks
The conventional ATM scenario considered is an en-route ATM sector con-
taining 15 aircraft. The responsibility of the air traffic controller is to give timely
instructions to the pilots on the basis of conventional surveillance, communication
and automation systems. The tasks of the tactical air traffic controller are now
subdivided along two dimensions: 1) generic cognitive activities and 2) scenario
specific tasks. For the scenario specific task division we focus on safety critical
actions in conventional en-route ATM. This leads to the identification of the fol-
lowing three scenario specific tasks:
A. Anticipate for aircraft deviating from intentions.
B. React to Automation alerts.
C. Perform other control activities.
For the division into generic cognitive activities we follow [7]. This leads to ten
generic cognitive activities. We next identified the scenario relevant task overlap
across the dimensions in the table below.
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Table 1: Relevant subtask overlap for the en-route ATM scenario.
Scenario specific subtask
Generic cognitive activity A. Anticipate B. Alerts C. Others
1 Sensing A1 C1
2 Integration A2 C2
3 Prediction A3 C3
4 Communication C4
5 Problem solving /planning A5 B5 C5
6 Executive action A6 B6 C6
7 Rule monitoring A7 B7 C7
8 Coordination C8
9 Overall performance C9
10 Maintenance
Next, a scheduling strategy for the relevant subtasks has been identified with
support from available ATM expertise on the aspects of pre-emption between
other subtasks and concurrent execution of two subtasks taking into account the
principles of [4]. The resulting model allows a flexible approach: one can restrict
to giving details relevant for the problem at hand along the scenario specific di-
mension, while the generic cognitive activities appropriately models the variety in
cognitive requirements placed on the controller.
3. Opportunistic and tactical control modes
In [6] a human reliability modelling approach has been introduced that aims
to bring into account that humans operate in various cognitive control strategies,
while the variation in these strategies is largely governed by the amount of sub-
jectively available time and the outcome of the previous action in terms of success
and failure. To illustrate the possible range of control strategies [6] proposes four
typical control modes:
- Scrambled control mode.
- Opportunistic control mode.
- Tactical control mode.
- Strategic control mode.
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Since [6] describes this control mode model in general terms only, the  specific
details for the en-route ATM scenario considered had to be identified on the basis
of domain expertise. In doing so it appeared that air traffic controllers easily rec-
ognized the switching control mode model to be a good representation of their per-
formance, and that the context specific knowledge for the different control modes
was readily available with human factors specialists in ATM. Based on this infor-
mation, we specified the detailed influence of the tactical and opportunistic control
modes on the performance. See the next table for subtasks A6 and A7. For the
other subtasks similar specifications are obtained [1]. It also appeared that the
strategic control mode was relevant only in non-critical situations, while the
scrambled control mode would not occur due to the fact that traffic flow is regu-
lated such that the maximal number of aircraft in each sector is kept below a cer-
tain upper bound.
Table 2: Control mode characteristics of subtasks A6 and A7.
Sub
task
Control mode Characterisation Mean
period
A6 Tactical The controller gives a series of R/T instructions to
the aircraft involved. He verifies whether the pi-
lot(s) readback these instructions correctly.
5 s
Opportunistic The verification of correct readback may be
omitted.
2.5 s
A7 Tactical After the R/T communication the controller veri-
fies whether the aircraft comply to his clearances.
30 s
Opportunistic This may be omitted or be performed less thor-
oughly.
15 s
Next we identified that ATCo related errors may occur at random during perform-
ance of subtask A6 where the frequency of occurrence depends on the control
mode the controller is in. Furthermore, such errors may be detected and corrected
during rule monitoring subtask A7, also depending on the control mode (e.g. [3]).
Following this approach, the net clearance error frequency is assumed to be 10
times higher when the controller is in opportunistic control mode rather then in
tactical control mode.
4. Example ATM application
We evaluated for an ATCo routine monitoring concept the period to detect severe
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deviations of aircraft from contoller expectation such that a comparison with
available statistical data is possible [8]. To do so, the ATCo performance model has
been integrated with appropriate models for the other relevant components in
conventional ATM for the specific ATM example. For details on this integration we
refer to [1]. Figure 1 compares the detection time results of the ATCo model (drawn
line) with the statistical data results (dashed line). This comparison clearly
contributes to gaining confidence in the model-based approach taken.




















Figure 1: ATCo detection time of severe deviations of model () and data (---).
5. Concluding remarks
Within the context of a conventional ATM scenario, this paper described the
development of a cognitive reliability model for a tactical en-route controller by
combining Hollnagel's control mode model with Multiple Resources theory and
human error models. In [1] this cognitive reliability model is integrated with all
other elements in the ATM scenario considered and is subsequently used to perform
accident risk assessment for ATM following the approach of [9].
During the collection of the scenario specific model details it appeared that air
traffic controllers easily recognized the switching control mode model to form a
good representation of their performance, and that the context specific knowl-
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edge for the different control modes was readily available with human factors spe-
cialists in ATM. Subsequently it has been shown that Monte Carlo simulation re-
sults of the model agree quite well with the statistical data in [8].
Follow-up work on Hollnagel’s control mode based cognitive reliability
modelling of human performance in ATM is directed to further model validation,
to enhance the developed modelling approach with other psychological models,
and further application to ATM safety assessment [10].
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